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In this paper, we examine the link of investment portfolio decisions of households and investment
on international capital ‡ows. I extend Bencivenga and Smith (1991)’s overlapping generation model
to an open economy and combine with capital market imperfections in Kiyotake and Moore (1997) to
address how the portfolio decisions of one countrty migh a¤ect that of the other country. In this general
equilibrium framework with ‡exible exchange rate, I …nd that the investment portfolio deicisions of
households are crucial for the directions of capital in‡ows. In other words, the portfolio decision of
individuals in one country is crucial for the deposit and loan rate, which would a¤ect where the capital
in‡ows from the foreign investors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
International capital ‡ows have attract broad attention recently, especially the short term
capital ‡ows. That is mainly due to the ability of international capital ‡ows in a¤ecting the
…nancial markets and individuals’ behaviors or vice versa. In order to look insight the short term
capital ‡ows, it is important to look at the capital accounts of a country. Despite di¢culties in
measuring capital accounts, one agreement is the two main components of the capital accounts:
foreign direct investment, and portfolio capital. While foreign direct investment is more likely
for long term, the portfolio capital is more likely for short term. In this paper, I am interested in
the short term capital ‡ows, so the attention of this paper is paid specially to the protfolio capital
in the capital accounts. The goal of this paper is to construct a model to analyze whether the
portfolio decisions of households are crucial for international capital ‡ows, whether the portfolio
decisions of one country would a¤ect that of another country, and what the implications are in
interpreting international capital ‡ows.
In the data, one could only observe the net capital ‡ows between two countries. This
observation may not be helpful in explaining the composition of international capital ‡ows. In
other words, the net capital ‡ows may remain the same while the foreign capital in‡ows increase
in one …nancial market but decrease in another. Therefore, in order to analyze the portfolio
capital ‡ows across countries, a theoretical model will be useful and helpful in understanding
better the international capital ‡ows. Moreover, this theoretical work would require international
credit markets, which could fund investment, as addressed by Boyed and Smith (1997). The
role of the international credit markets is to provide external and internal …nance for investors.
Another theoretical work that includes both internal and external …nance is Chevalier and
Sharfstein (1996). However, both external and internal …nance are treated as dummy variables
for …rms in a closed economy without explicit capital markets. In order to achieve the goal
mentioned above, the existence of international capital markets is important. Moreover, in a
general equilibrium analysis, the roles of households …rms and …nancial intermediaries are also
signi…cant. This paper comes across various theoretical literature, which includes the research in
international capital ‡ows [Chang and Velasco (2001)], in capital market imperfections [Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), Eicher and Turnovsky (1999), Kiyotake and Moore (1997)], in
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…nancial fragility [Chang and Velasco (2000), Kiyotaki and Moore (2002)], in investment portfolio
decisions [Ennis and Keister (2006)], and also in …nancial intermediaries [Bencivenga and Smith
(1991), Diamond and Dybvig (1983)]. Among these studies, in order to explain capital ‡ows,
Chang and Velaso (2001) extended the Diamond-Dybvig model to an open economy and limit
the focus on illiquid banks, in which the role of …rms and di¤erent capital markets are not taken
into account. This paper is to take the step forward to integrate these literature to …nd how
much more we could explain the international capital ‡ows with the existence of international
capital markets in the general equilibrium analysis.
In this paper, I extend Bencivenga and Smith (1991)’s three-period-lived overlapping gener-
ation model to an open economy with two countries, home and foreign countries. Households
deposit their income into …nancial intermediaries, which would lend it to …rms as loan or invest
in the equity markets. Firms need to borrow to start their production. Therefore two ways for
the …rms to obtain the fund: internal or external …nance. While the households make decisions
to maximize their utility, both the …rms and the …nancial intermediaries make decisions to max-
imize the pro…ts. The role of …nancial intermediaries is as a middleman between investors and
fund-raisers, and between depositors and loan demanders.
As a result, the equilibrium deposit rate is increasing in equity rate and in the proportion
of investors, but decreasing in the proportion of domestic investors. Not surprisingly, the loan
rate is increasing in deposit rate. The shift of reinvestment by domestic investors and foreign
investors towards to domestic saving accounts rather than investment accounts would stimulate
the deposit rate and the loan rate in the domestic country. This increase in the deposit rate and
loan rate could appreciate domestic currency and attract capital in‡ow from foreign investors to
the domestic loan market. A portfolio decisions moving towards to short run accounts which
including both saving and investment accounts, however, tend to reduce the deposit and the
loan rates, which might depreciate domestic currency and discourage the capital in‡ows by the
foreign investors to the domestic loan market. However, this decrease in loan rate might drive
up the wage rate and the capital investment by the entrepreneurs. To conclude, the portfolio
decisions of households and investors are very important in determining the deposit and the loan
rate, which are crucial for the directions of the capital in‡ows to the domestic country. This
model can be extended in several ways in helping understanding the international capital ‡ows
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in di¤erent aspects. The extensions could include the redistribution of the fund by …nancial
intermediaries, the e¤ects of restrictions on capital account liberalization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment of the
model, followed by results in Section 3. Discussions and Conclusions are in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively.
2. THE MODEL
This paper extends the three-period-lived overlapping generation framework of Bencivenga
and Smith (1991) to an open economy combined with the capital market imperfections in Kiy-
otake and Moore (1997, 2002) to discuss how individuals’ investment portfolio decision in one
country could a¤ect the portfolio decisions of individuals in another country, and hence the com-
position of international capital ‡ows. In this open economy, there are two countries, home and
foreign. In the benchmark model, the populations are assumed to be constant and the same
in both countries,  = ¤. These two countries are assumed symmetric to begin with. Each
country contains households, …rms and …nancial intermediaries. The credit markets in each
country are the loan market and the equity market. Without losing generality, it is assumed
that …nancial intermediaries are the only institutions with the access to invest in the loan and
equity markets. Therefore, the households would have to invest via …nancial intermediaries, and
…rms could request loans from the …nancial intermediaries or raise funds from the equity market.
In other words, the …nancial intermediaries serve as middlemen between …rms and households in
the loan and equity markets. While households maximize the utility, both …rms and …nancial
intermediaries maximize pro…ts. The details are below.
2.1. Households
Each individual lives for three periods: young, middle-aged and old, and is identical ex ante.
That is, each young is endowed with one unit of labour, and values only the consumption at
middle-aged (2+1) and at old (3+2). The utility of an individual is in the form of
(2+1 3+2) = ¡(2+1 + 
3+2)¡

 (1)
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where  =  for investors,  =  for entrepreneurs, and 0      1. In other
words, investors are less impatient than entrepreneurs. Therefore, each individual earns income
by supplying labour for production when young save the income by allocating between di¤erent
accounts o¤ered by the …nancial intermediaries since having no direct access to the loan and
equity markets.
The accounts available in the …nancial intermediaries can be divided into short-run and long
run accounts. The short run accounts take one period to mature, while the long run accounts
take two periods to mature. There are two types of short run accounts: saving accounts and
investment accounts, and one type of long run accounts: term deposit accounts. The saving
accounts earn the net interest rate
¡

¢
, which is pre-determined by the …nancial intermediaries
at the time of opening an account. The investment account would earn the net return rate
¡
+1
¢
,
which is determined by the equity market at the beginning of the period before individuals learn
about their own type. The term deposit accounts would earn the net interest rate
¡

¢
at the
mature time. The value of  is also determined by the …nancial intermediaries at the time of
opening the account, and an early liquidation of the term deposit account would lower the net
interest rate to  , where 

  

  

 , and 

  

  

 .
Let  denote the proportion of income a young individual would save into short run accounts,
and let  denote the proportion of the short run accounts that is allocated in the investment
accounts. Therefore, the fraction of income placed in the saving account by a young individual
is 
¡
1 ¡ ¢, the fraction in the investment account is  , and the fraction in the term
deposit account is
¡
1 ¡ ¢. The total repayment an individual could receive from the short
run accounts at the beginning of middle-aged at period  is
 ´
¡
1 + ¡1
¢

¡
1 ¡ ¢¡1 + ¡1 +  ¢¡1 (2)
At the beginning of middle-aged, each individual learns its own type: an investor or an
entrepreneur. With probability , the individual turns to an investor, and probability (1 ¡ ),
the individual turns to an entrepreneur, who have the skills to …nance projects and to operate
…rms. Each individual’s type is private information. The distribution of types, however, is
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publicly known. The investors and the entrepreneurs are di¤erent in the way they spend the
repayment from the short run accounts, both saving and investment accounts. An investors
would decide whether to re-invest, and where to re-invest while an entrepreneur would start
operating a …rm.
Let  denote the fraction of reinvestment placed in the investment account by a middle-
aged investor, so the fraction
¡
1 ¡ ¢ is the fraction of investment placed in the saving account.
Therefore, the incentive constraint for a middle-aged investor at period  not to early liquidate
term deposit accounts and to re-invest is
2 + 
©£¡
1 + 
¢ ¡
1 ¡ ¢ + ¡1 + +1¢¤ ¡ ¡ 2¢ + ¡1 + ¡1 ¢ ¡1 ¡ ¢¡1ª(3)
¸  + 
¡
1 + ¡1
¢ ¡
1 ¡ ¢¡1
¸  +
¡
1 + ¡1
¢ ¡
1 ¡ ¢¡1
where the …rst line represent the present value of lifetime consumption with reinvestment and
without early liquidation from the term deposit accounts, the second line is without reinvestment
and without early liquidation from the term deposit account, and the third line is without
reinvestment and with early liquidation from all in the term deposit accounts.
Moreover, as a middle-aged investor, one could decide whether to re-invest in either domestic
or foreign …nancial intermediaries, but not both. This assumption may be relaxed later.
Let ¦+1 denote the pro…t an entrepreneur could earn at period +1 by undertaking a project
a project at period , the strong incentive constraint for an entrepreneur to undertake a project
and operate a …rm is:
¦+1 ¸
£¡
1 + 
¢ ¡
1 ¡ ¢ + ¡1 + +1¢¤  (4)
Equation (4) states that the capital gain from production is higher than re-investment even
without counting for middle-aged consumption.
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2.2. The Firms
After learning the type, an entrepreneur obtains the skills to transform output goods into
capital goods for production and the skills to operate a …rm. The production requires both
capital goods and labour as inputs, and it takes one period to complete production. In order
to start production, an entrepreneur must transform part of  into capital goods, and hire
labours. It is assumed that the labours would start working after getting the payment. However,
the entrepreneurs do not have su¢cient fund to pay the labour costs. Thus, in order to operate
a …rm, the entrepreneur must borrow su¢cient amount ()
 ¸  + + 2 + ¡  (5)
where  is the amount of capital goods transformed by an entrepreneur,  is the amount of
labour united hired by the …rm, and  is the amount of goods used as collateral to get the
loan from the …nancial intermediaries.  = 0, if the entrepreneur raises the fund in the equity
market. The capital goods can last only one period, then fully depreciate. There is no market
for trading capital goods.
The production is in the form of Cobb-Douglas with constant return to scale, and it takes
one period to complete production: +1 =  
1¡
 , where 0    1,  and  represent
the production technology, and the amount of output produced at period , respectively. It is
after the production, the entrepreneurs have the ability to repay the loan. So the debt here is
one-period short-term debt. To simplify the model, we assume that there is no default risk for
…rms’ production, so the loan can always be repaid. This assumption can be relaxed later.
There are two …nancial methods available for …rms. One is to borrow from the domestic
…nancial intermediaries, and the other is to raise fund in domestic equity market by issuing
equities. The available loanable fund in the …nancial intermediaries is limited, and only a
proportion of …rms () could obtain it. These …rms are called debt-…nance …rms. The rest of
…rms (1 ¡ ), which obtains the fund in the equity market, is called equity-…nance …rms.
By choosing the amount of  to hire and the amount of  to transform, a debt-…nance
…rm maximizes the pro…t: ¦+1 = +1 ¡
¡
1 + 
¢
, and an equity-…nance …rm maximizes
the pro…t: ¦+1 = +1 ¡
¡
1 + +1
¢
. Both types of …rms are subject to equations (4) and
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(5). As soon as obtaining the fund, both the debt- and equity-…nance …rms hire labours and
start production. However, this is before the realization of +1. Thus, in order to decide the
amount of  to hire, the equity-…nance …rms form their expectation of +1at period , and it is
assumed 
¡
+1
¢
=  . This implies that the amount of  hired by an equity-…nance …rm
would be the same as that hired by a debt-…nance …rm.
Every period, there are (1 ¡ ) middle-aged households turning new entrepreneurs, who
could start operating …rms. With full employment assumption, by combining the …rst order
condition with respect to  and the labour market clearing condition,  = 1 (1 ¡ ), the
equilibrium wage rate can be solved:
 = (1 ¡ )
"
 (1 ¡ )¡
1 + 
¢#  (6)
The amount of  an entrepreneur would transform is:
 =
1
1 ¡ 
·

1 + 
¸1(1¡)
 (7)
 =
µ

1 + 
¶(1¡)  (1 ¡ )¡
1 + 
¢
 =
1(1¡) 
(1¡) (1 ¡ )¡
1 + 
¢1(1¡)
2.3. The Financial Markets
As mentioned above, the …rms could …nance its operation expenses in two ways, loan or equity,
but not both. So the two …nancial markets in this model are the loan market and the equity
market. The role played by the …nancial intermediaries is very important in this model. The
…nancial intermediaries serve as a middleman between the …rms and the depositors, and between
the investors and the equity market. Among three types of accounts o¤ered to households, the
idea of demand deposit applies to only saving, and term deposit accounts. That is, by failing
8
to repay the depositors for their saving and term deposit accounts as promised in the deposit
contracts, the …nancial intermediary is subject to run.
One strong assumption we made for the benchmark model is that the …nancial intermediaries
would restrict the loanable fund to the sum of saving accounts, and not any other accounts. This
assumption could later be relaxed to discuss more complicated matters.
Debt …nance and equity …nance in this model are di¤erent in several ways. First, debt …-
nance is between domestic entrepreneurs and domestic …nancial intermediaries. Equity issuance,
however, can be extended to foreign equity market, depending on the capital account openness.
In the benchmark model, we have symmetric capital account liberation for both countries. Sec-
ond, with limited resources, the available loanable fund cannot satisfy all …rms. The …rms
would either obtain the amount required or none. This is what so called the …rst type credit
rationing. The equity market, however, is open to all …rms who do not obtain the loan from
the …nancial intermediaries. Third, a collateral is required for debt …nance but not for equity
…nance. Fourth, the loan rate
¡

¢
is set by the …nancial intermediaries at the time of signing
the loan contract. The return rate to pay the equity holders who purchase the equity at period
,
¡
+1
¢
, however, is determined by the equity market clearing condition after the production is
complete.
A …nancial intermediary would maximize its own pro…t by choosing (i) the deposit rates for
the saving accounts
¡

¢
(ii) the deposit rate for the term deposit accounts
¡

¢
, (iii) the loan
rate
¡

¢
for …rms, and (iv) the proportion of long-term investment to liquidate prematurely
() to prevent bank runs. Let  and (1 ¡ ¤) denote the proportion of domestic and foreign
middle-aged investors, who re-invest via domestic …nancial intermediaries, respectively. The
pro…t of domestic …nancial intermediaries ¦ is:
¦+1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
£

¡
1 ¡ ¢ ¡  (1 ¡ )¤ + ¡1 ¡ ¢ (1 ¡ ) £¡1 + ¡2¢ ¡ ¡1 + ¡2 ¢¤¡2
+
£¡
1 + ¡1
¢
¡1 (1 ¡ ) ¡
¡
1 + ¡1
¢

¡
1 ¡ ¢¡1¤
+
¡
1 ¡ ¢ £¡ ¡ 2¢ ¡ ¡1 + ¡1¢ ¡¡1 ¡ 2¡1¢¤
+¤ (1 ¡ ¤) ¡1 ¡ ¤¢¤ £¡¤ ¡ ¤2¢ ¡ ¡1 + ¡1¢ ¡¤¡1 ¡ ¤2¡1¢¤
9>>>>=>>>>;
(8)
where the …rst term is the saving accounts for the generation  that is loan out to the new
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entrepreneurs, the second term is the pro…t from matured term deposit accounts, the third term
is the repayment of the loan to repay the saving accounts, the fourth term is about the middle-
aged domestic investors and the …fth term is about the middle-aged foreign investors. The
details of the capital ‡ow is shown in Figure 2.
The constraints faced by the …nancial intermediaries include liquidity constraints for each
period and the incentive constraints to attract both the middle-aged domestic and foreign in-
vestors. There are several ways to manage di¤erent accounts. One way is to separate the short
term and long term accounts, and to allow early premature liquidation on long term accounts to
take care of the shortage of short-term repayment. Therefore, the liquidity constraints are as
follows:264  ¡1 ¡ ¢ +  ¡1 ¡ ¢ ¡ ¡ 2¢ + ¡1 + ¡1 ¢¡1 (1 ¡ )
+¤ (1 ¡ ¤) ¡1 ¡ ¤¢¤ ¡¤ ¡ ¤2¢ + (1 + ¡2) (1 ¡ )¡2
375 (9)
¸
264  (1 ¡ ) +  ¡1 ¡ ¢ ¡1 + ¡1¢ ¡¡1 ¡ 2¡1¢ + ¡1 + ¡1¢ ¡1 ¡ ¢¡1
+¤ (1 ¡ ¤) ¡1 ¡ ¤¢¤ ¡1 + ¡1¢ ¡¤¡1 ¡ ¤2¡1¢
375 
(1 ¡ ) ¡1 + ¡2¢ ¸ ¡1 + ¡2 ¢  (10)
where equation (9) and (10) are for the short term and the long term accounts, respectively.
When counting for the return of the foreign investment, it is important to count for the
exchange rate. Let  denote the real exchange rate at period , de…ned as  = ¤ , where 
(¤ ) represents the real value of the domestic (foreign) country’s currency. The domestic and
foreign investors would reinvest in domestic …nancial intermediaries if the following conditions
hold, respectively.
¡
1 + 
¢ ¡
1 ¡ ¢ + ¡1 + +1¢ ¸ (1) £¡1 + ¤ ¢ ¡1 ¡ ¤¢ + ¡1 + ¤+1¢¤¤(11)¡
1 + 
¢ ¡
1 ¡ ¤¢ + ¡1 + +1¢¤ ¸ () £¡1 + ¤ ¢ ¡1 ¡ ¢ + ¡1 + ¤+1¢ ¤  (12)
In equilibrium, both the loan market and the equity market will be clear. The loan market
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clearing condition is:

¡
1 ¡ ¢ +  ¡1 ¡ ¢ ¡ ¡ 2¢ + (1)¤ (1 ¡ ¤) ¡1 ¡ ¤¢¤ ¡¤ ¡ ¤2¢
=  (1 ¡ ) (13)
where the left hand side is the loan supply, and the right hand side is the loan demand. The
equity market clearing condition is:
 + 
¡
 ¡ 2
¢
+ (1)
¤ (1 ¡ ¤)¤¤ ¡¤ ¡ ¤2¢ (14)
=  (1 ¡ ) (1 ¡ ) 
3. EQUILIBRIUM
There are multi equilibria in this model. We are interested in the case in which the investors
reinvest and the entrepreneurs operate …rms and conduct production. Take the extreme case,
if 2  
£¡
1 + 
¢ ¡
1 ¡ ¢ + ¡1 + +1¢¤ 2, then the investors would choose 2 = 0,
and 3+1 =
£¡
1 + 
¢ ¡
1 ¡ ¢ + ¡1 + +1¢ ¤ + ¡1 + ¡1 ¢ ¡1 ¡ ¢¡1. Due to
the returns for long term accounts,   

 , the …nancial intermediaries would not want
to liquidate long term accounts prematurely if not necessary. Therefore, without unexpected
withdrawals, the values of  = 0,
 =
8>><>>>:
¡
1 ¡ ¢ £1 ¡1 ¡ ¢ + 3¤
+4
¡
1 ¡  ¢ ¡  ¡1 ¡ ¢ (1 + 1)
+¤ (1 ¡ ¤) ¡1 ¡ ¤¢¤ £1¤ ¡1 ¡ ¤¤ ¡¤¢¤
9>>=>>>;
 (1 ¡  ) (1 + 1)
(15)
 =

£

¡
1 ¡ ¢ +  ¡1 ¡ ¢ + ¤ (1 ¡ ¤) ¡1 ¡ ¤¢ (¤)¤¤
 (1 ¡ ) (16)
 = 
 (17)
As shown in equations (15) and (16), the equilibrium deposit rate is increasing in equity rate
and in the proportion of investors, but decreasing in the proportion of domestic investors. Not
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surprisingly, the loan rate is increasing in deposit rate. The shift of reinvestment by domes-
tic investors and foreign investors towards to domestic saving accounts rather than investment
accounts would stimulate the deposit rate and the loan rate in the domestic country. This
increase in the deposit rate and loan rate could appreciate domestic currency and attract capital
in‡ow from foreign investors to the domestic loan market. A portfolio decisions moving towards
to short run accounts which including both saving and investment accounts, however, tend to
reduce the deposit and the loan rates, which might depreciate domestic currency and discourage
the capital in‡ows by the foreign investors to the domestic loan market. However, this decrease
in loan rate might drive up the wage rate and the capital investment by the entrepreneurs. To
conclude, the portfolio decisions of households and investors are very important in determining
the deposit and the loan rate, which are crucial for the directions of the capital in‡ows to the
domestic country. This model can be extended in several ways in helping understanding the
international capital ‡ows in di¤erent aspects. The extensions could include the redistribution of
the fund by …nancial intermediaries, the e¤ects of restrictions on capital account liberalization.
In might be worth mentioning that in the closed economy, without the e¤ects of foreign
investors, domestic deposit and loan rate would be lower than the open economy [equations (19)
and (20)].
 =
8><>:
¡
1 ¡ ¢ £1 ¡1 ¡ ¢ + 3¤
+4
¡
1 ¡  ¢ ¡  ¡1 ¡ ¢ (1 + 1)
9>=>;
 (1 ¡  ) (1 + 1)
(18)
 =

£

¡
1 ¡ ¢ +  ¡1 ¡ ¢¤
 (1 ¡ ) (19)
The e¤ects of the portfolio decisions on the deposit rate and loan rate remain similar to the case
of an open economy.
4. CONCLUSION & EXTENSIONS
As shown in equations (15) and (16), the equilibrium deposit rate is increasing in equity rate
and in the proportion of investors, but decreasing in the proportion of domestic investors. Not
surprisingly, the loan rate is increasing in deposit rate. The shift of reinvestment by domes-
12
tic investors and foreign investors towards to domestic saving accounts rather than investment
accounts would stimulate the deposit rate and the loan rate in the domestic country. This
increase in the deposit rate and loan rate could appreciate domestic currency and attract capital
in‡ow from foreign investors to the domestic loan market. A portfolio decisions moving towards
to short run accounts which including both saving and investment accounts, however, tend to
reduce the deposit and the loan rates, which might depreciate domestic currency and discourage
the capital in‡ows by the foreign investors to the domestic loan market. However, this decrease
in loan rate might drive up the wage rate and the capital investment by the entrepreneurs. To
conclude, the portfolio decisions of households and investors are very important in determining
the deposit and the loan rate, which are crucial for the directions of the capital in‡ows to the
domestic country.
This model can be extended in several ways in helping understanding the international capital
‡ows in di¤erent aspects. The extensions could include the redistribution of the fund by …nancial
intermediaries, the e¤ects of restrictions on capital account liberalization. Moreover, it is possible
to allow for default risk on repaying the loan and the possibility of bank runs.

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Figure one: the decisions of households
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Figure two: the decisions of investors
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Figure three: the ‡ows of fund
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